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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is a trademark infringement case concerning 
products in the home lawn and garden market.  The owner of the 
trademark "Fairway" for peat moss alleges another company 
infringed its right to the mark and competed unfairly by selling 
fertilizer under the name "Fairway Green."  
 Fisons Horticulture, Inc. ("Fisons"), a Canadian 
corporation with its principal place of business in Bellvue, 
Washington, brought this suit against Vigoro Industries, Inc., 
("Vigoro"), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in Fairview Heights, Illinois.  Fisons, which markets 
peat moss under the registered trademark "Fairway", claims 
Vigoro's use of the brand name "Fairway Green" for fertilizer 
constitutes trademark infringement0 and unfair competition0under 
                                                           
0Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988 & Supp. IV 
1992) protects registered trademarks and provides in part: 
 
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the 
registrant -- 
 
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, 
copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark 
3 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992), 
infringement of a common law trademark, common law unfair 
competition, and violates the Delaware Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 2531-33 (1993). 
 After a bench trial, the district court entered 
judgment for Vigoro on Fisons' claims and for Fisons on Vigoro's 
cross-claim for attorneys' fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), as 
provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1117.  Both parties appealed.  For 
reasons that follow, we will reverse the district court's 
judgment for Vigoro on Fisons' Lanham Act claims, affirm its 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
distribution, or advertising of any goods or 
services on or in connection with which such use 
is likely to cause confusion, . . .  
  . . . 
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for 
the remedies hereinafter provided. 
0Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988 & Supp. 
IV 1992), which provides protection for both registered and 
unregistered marks, states in part: 
 
(a)(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any 
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in 
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or 
any combination thereof, or any false designation of 
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or 
false or misleading representation of fact, which -- 
 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, 
or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person, . . . 
  . . . 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who 
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged 
by such act.   
4 




A.  Fisons Horticulture, Inc. and Fairway Peat Moss  
 Fisons is a subsidiary of a British-owned company, 
Fisons, PLC, which has three divisions: pharmaceuticals, 
scientific equipment, and horticultural products. Its 
horticulture division has companies in the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Benelux Countries, as well as in North America.  
 Fisons markets Canadian sphagnum peat moss, a natural 
organic product used to improve soil texture and protect plants 
from temperature extremes, under the registered trademark 
"Fairway" in the United States.  Fisons acquired the Fairway 
trademark in 1980 from the original owner, Western Peat Company, 
Ltd., which first used the trade name in 1959 and registered it 
in 1960. 
 Fairway is not the only name under which Fisons sells 
peat moss; it also uses the names "Sunshine" and "Parkland." 
Sunshine and Parkland together account for over 95% of its sales 
in the United States and Fairway accounts for the remainder.0 
Fisons' three brands of peat moss account for about 25% of the 
U.S. peat moss market.  From 1987 through 1991, Fisons sold over 
                                                           
0It is not uncommon for one business to use multiple brand names 
for what is essentially the same product; the use of different 
brand names allows Fisons to sell peat moss to a lawn and garden 
store under a brand name not sold by a nearby competing discount 
outlet.  
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$500,000 of Fairway peat moss each year.  Fisons sells Fairway 
peat moss primarily to homeowners for lawn and garden care 
through the traditional channels -- lawn and garden stores, 
hardware stores, home improvement centers, supermarkets, drug 
stores, and discount stores.  Fisons does not advertise Fairway 
peat moss directly to consumers.  Instead, it promotes its 
product to retailers, makes advertising copy available to them, 
and reimburses them for their advertising expenses.0   
 Besides selling peat moss, Fisons sells to the U.S. 
greenhouse market potting mixes; analyses of soil, water and 
tissue samples; and professional fertilizer.  It also offers an 
extensive line of lawn and garden products in Canada.  Fisons has 
been considering expanding its product line in the United States 
by acquiring regional fertilizer brands and unifying them as a 
national brand for the consumer fertilizer market.  One of the 
proposed trademarks for the national fertilizer brand is Fairway. 
 Fairway peat moss is sold in a white plastic bag with 
the mark "Fairway" in large script in green letters above the 
words "peat moss" in block red letters.  The bag has a central 
design of a golf course green surrounded by roses.  A pin with a 
red triangular flag appears in the center of the green, and the 
word "sphagnum" is printed in white on the flag.  On the back of 
the package, recommended uses are listed as "preparing new 
lawns," "top dressing old lawns," and "garden soil mix or mulch." 
                                                           
0But in 1990, a year in which Fisons had retail sales of Fairway 
peat moss in 17 states for a total of $684,316, only one retailer 
published an advertisement for Fairway; it sought reimbursement 
for $1,232.57.   
6 
The package notes that peat moss is used with fertilizer and that 
it "saves fertilizer". 
 
B.  Vigoro Industries, Inc. and Fairway Green Fertilizer 
 Vigoro Industries has been in the fertilizer business 
in the United States since 1890, and the Vigoro name has been 
used on products since 1924.  It is a prominent name in the 
industry and it plans to compete with the market leader, O.M. 
Scott & Sons Co., across the full range of Scott products. Vigoro 
sells its products to consumers through garden centers, discount 
stores, hardware stores, seed and feed stores, home improvement 
centers and supermarkets and drug stores.  
 Before 1991, Vigoro offered standard quality fertilizer 
to consumers, but in 1991, it decided to offer to the upscale 
consumer market a new line of premium-quality fertilizers, 
containing the patented slow-release nitrogen ingredient it used 
in its premium golf course fertilizer.  Vigoro hired an 
advertising agency to help select a name and promotional program 
for the new product.  After a search disclosed that many proposed 
names were registered as trademarks by other companies, the 
agency recommended "Fairway Green."0 
                                                           
0One of the names explored for Vigoro's new line of fertilizers 
was "Golf Course Green," but the advertising agency's trademark 
attorney found that a subsidiary of Sandoz Pharmaceutical 
Corporation owned the named "Golf" for fertilizers and 
herbicides.  The trademark appeared to be inactive, so Vigoro 
requested a royalty-free license to use "Golf Course Green." When 
it was refused, Vigoro decided not to use the name.  Vigoro made 
no similar request of Fisons or any other owners of a "Fairway" 
trademark.   
7 
 The agency's trademark counsel stated in her 
recommendation that "Fairway" was registered as a trademark by 
several companies: 
 As we discussed, there is a possibility 
that one or more of the owners of "fairway" 
marks might contest Vigoro's right to use 
FAIRWAY GREEN.  However, since there is no 
history of any of the prior users opposing 
each other's uses of "fairway," the risk 
should be acceptabl[y] low. 
 
 There is also a risk that the 
application will be assigned to an examiner 
who will take a strict position and site 
[sic] one or more of the prior "fairway" 
registrations as grounds for refusing to 
register your mark.  Because so many 
"fairway" marks have been registered in the 
past I believe this risk is also low.  
Fisons Horticulture, Inc., v. Vigoro Indus., No. 92-66, slip op. 
at 3 (D. Del. Mar. 3, 1993).   
 There were several other registrations and applications 
including the word "Fairway," but few of them were in the same 
trademark category as Fisons' Fairway, that is, U.S. class 10, 
"Fertilizers."  In that class, Western Peat, Fisons' predecessor, 
had registered "Fairway" for peat moss in 1960 and O.M. Scott had 
registered "Super Fairway" for agricultural and horticultural 
fertilizers in 1988.  O. M. Scott marketed Super Fairway for 
commercial but not consumer use.  After Vigoro applied for 
registration of "Fairway Green" for its fertilizers in May, 1991, 
Fisons contested both that application and O. M. Scott's prior 
registration and applied for its own registration of "Fairway" 
for fertilizer.   
8 
 In addition to these trademark registrations and 
applications in U.S. trademark class 10, approximately six 
companies had registered or were trying to register "Fairway" for 
one or more other products and services related to lawns and 
gardens: grass seed, lawn and garden machinery and equipment, and 
lawn services; but only three such registrations were completed 
and active at the time the survey was made.  Others were pending 
or had been abandoned.  Finally, there were unregistered uses of 
the name "Fairway" for goods and services relating to lawns and 
gardens, as shown by surveys of telephone books. 
 In May, 1991, Vigoro decided on the Fairway Green name. 
It filed its trademark application on May 20, 1991 and introduced 
the new product line at the National Hardware Show in August, 
1991.  The Hardware Show was the first notice Fisons had of 
Vigoro's use of the name "Fairway Green."  By June, 1992, Vigoro 
had spent over $500,000 on advertising and promotion and had sold 
approximately $1.3 million of Fairway Green products in 33 
states.  Fisons protested Vigoro's attempt to register the 
trademark on September 26, 1991 and filed a suit in Delaware 
Chancery Court on January 10, 1992; Vigoro removed it to United 
States District Court.  
 Fairway Green fertilizer is sold in a heavy paper bag. 
The background color of the bag is green, red, purple or magenta, 
depending on which of four varieties of the fertilizer it 
contains.  On the front of the bag is a large yellow rectangle 
that has in white on purple the words "Vigoro" at the top and 
"Premium Lawn Fertilizer" just below the middle.  Between these 
9 
two, in larger green letters with yellow highlighting borders, 
are the words "Fairway Green."  The word "Fairway" arches over 
the word "Green," and in the arch is a golf course green 
containing a golf ball, cup, and a pin with a red triangular 
flag.  Behind the golf course green is a yellow setting sun with 
blue rays.  On the package is the statement:  "Keeps grass green 
longer with fewer clippings when compared with soluble 
fertilizers.  Contains the controlled-release nitrogen used on 70 
of America's top 100 golf courses.  Environmentally-oriented, 
formulated without nitrates." 
 
C.  Purchase and Use of the Products  
 Fairway peat moss and Fairway Green fertilizer occupy 
the same segment of the lawn and garden products market, the 
"fertilizer/soil conditioner" segment.  They are frequently used 
together to prepare the soil for planting, but the use of peat 
moss may cut down on the use of fertilizer, as noted on the 
Fairway peat moss package.  The two products are both low-cost 
items,0 and there was testimony that consumers who use these 
products typically spend very little time deciding which product 
to buy.  Peat moss and lawn and garden fertilizers are often 
displayed in the same area of stores, and both target homeowners 
who do their own lawn and garden work.  A number of other 
companies selling lawn and garden products, including the market 
                                                           
0A 4 cubic foot bag of Fairway peat moss has a retail price of 
approximately $8.00 - $15.00; a 20-25 pound bag of Fairway Green 
fertilizer has a retail price of approximately $8.00 - $15.00, 
with discounts and rebates.  
10 
leader, O.M. Scott, sell both peat moss and fertilizer; Vigoro 
sells bark mulch as well as fertilizer. 
 
II. 
 "The law of trademark protects trademark owners in the 
exclusive use of their marks when use by another would be likely 
to cause confusion."  Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 
460, 462 (3d Cir. 1983); see, Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor 
Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291-93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 
S.Ct. 373 (1991), and authorities cited therein; Scott Paper Co. 
v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228-29 (3d Cir. 
1978).  To prove trademark infringement, a plaintiff must show 
that: (1) the mark is valid and legally protectable; (2) the mark 
is owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant's use of the 
mark to identify goods or services is likely to create confusion 
concerning the origin of the goods or services.  Ford Motor Co., 
930 F.2d at 291 (citing Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent 
Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990)).   
 The first two requirements, validity and legal 
protectability, are proven where, as here, a mark was federally 
registered and has become "incontestible" under the Lanham Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1058 and 1065.0  Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 291 
(citing Opticians Ass'n, 920 F.2d at 194).  If the mark has not 
                                                           
0A trademark becomes incontestable after the owner files 
affidavits stating that the mark has been registered, that it has 
been in continuous use for five consecutive years, and that there 
is no pending proceeding and there has been no adverse decision 
concerning the registrant's ownership or right to registration. 
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been federally registered or, if registered, has not achieved 
incontestability, validity depends on proof of secondary meaning, 
unless the unregistered mark is inherently distinctive.  Ford 
Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 291 (citing A.J. Canfield Co. v. 
Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 1986)).  The mark in this 
case is both registered and incontestible. 
 A plaintiff must also prove the third requirement, the 
likelihood of confusion, which exists "when the consumers viewing 
the mark would probably assume that the product or service it 
represents is associated with the source of a different product 
or service identified by a similar mark."  Dranoff-Perlstein 
Assoc. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 862 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal 
quotations omitted).  "Proof of actual confusion is not 
necessary; likelihood of confusion is all that need be shown." 
Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 292 (internal citations omitted).0   
The showing of proof plaintiff must make for this requirement 
depends on whether the goods or services offered by the trademark 
                                                           
0Some actions brought under the Lanham Act require proof of 
actual confusion and others do not.  In an action brought under 
sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act for trademark 
infringement, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a)(1)(A), plaintiff 
need not provide proof of actual confusion; he need only show 
likelihood of confusion.  Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 292.  In an 
action brought under another part of section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act for false advertising, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), plaintiff 
need not prove the challenged advertising misled the public if he 
can show it was literally false.  However, if his claim is not 
that the advertising was false but that it was misleading, he 
must prove the public was actually misled or confused by it. 
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, 19 F.3d 125, 129-30 (3d Cir. 
1994); Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 
902 F.2d 222, 228-29 (3d Cir. 1990).  
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owner and the alleged infringer are in direct competition. "Where 
the trademark owner and the alleged infringer deal in competing 
goods or services, the court need rarely look beyond the mark 
itself."  Lapp, 721 F.2d at 462 (citations omitted). The court 
focuses on the marks to determine whether they are "confusingly 
similar."  Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d 1056, 1063 
(3d Cir. 1991).  Where the goods or services are not competing, 
the similarity of the marks is only one of a number of factors 
the court must examine to determine likelihood of confusion.  
To determine likelihood of confusion where 
the plaintiff and defendant deal in non-
competing goods or services, the court must 
look beyond the trademark to the nature of 
the products themselves, and to the context 
in which they are marketed and sold.  The 
closer the relationship between the products, 
and the more similar their sales contexts, 
the greater the likelihood of confusion. Once 
a trademark owner demonstrates the likelihood 
of confusion, it is entitled to injunctive 
relief. 
Lapp, 721 F.2d at 462 (citations omitted).   
 Likelihood of confusion is also the test for actions 
brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§1125(a)(1)(A) for unfair competition to prevent false 
representations as to the source or origin of goods or services 
by a mark confusingly similar to one already in use.  See, e.g., 
Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v. Suntan Research & Development Inc., 656 
F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (factors relevant to 
unfair competition claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 "essentially the 
same" as those relevant to trademark infringement claim under 15 
U.S.C. § 1114). 
13 
 
A.  Likelihood of Confusion Under the Lanham Act. 
 We have adopted a ten-factor test to determine 
likelihood of confusion in the market place as to a product's 
source in cases of alleged trademark infringement and unfair 
competition by a producer of a non-competing product.  Dranoff-
Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 862-63 (3d Cir. 1992); Ford Motor Co., 930 
F.2d at 293;  Lapp, 721 F.2d at 463; Scott Paper, 589 F.2d at 
1229.  They are:  
 (1) degree of similarity between the owner's mark and 
the alleged infringing mark;  
 (2) the strength of the owner's mark;  
 (3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative 
of the care and attention expected of consumers when making a 
purchase;  
 (4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark 
without evidence of actual confusion arising;  
 (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; 
 (6) the evidence of actual confusion;  
 (7) whether the goods, though not competing, are 
marketed through the same channels of trade and advertised 
through the same media;  
 (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties' 
sales efforts are the same;  
 (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of 
consumers because of the similarity of function; and  
14 
 (10) other facts suggesting that the consuming public 
might expect the prior owner to manufacture a product in the 
defendant's market, or that he is likely to expand into that 
market.  
 In Lapp, we applied these factors to decide an issue of 
trademark protection where two parties used the same trademark on 
non-competing products.  The Lapp Division of plaintiff Interpace 
Corporation ("Lapp-Interpace") made and sold ceramic insulators 
under the "Lapp" trademark.  The trademark was registered in 
1953.  Defendant, Lapp, Inc., the U.S. marketing arm of a German 
corporation, had distributed wire, cable and related electrical 
hardware in the U.S. under the names "Lapp" and "Lapp Cable" 
since 1977 but had never applied for federal registration of its 
mark.  Lapp-Interpace sued under the Lanham Act to enjoin Lapp, 
Inc., from using the "Lapp" name on its products.  The district 
court had dismissed the complaint because of its reading of Scott 
Paper.  We reversed, holding that Scott Paper mandated judgment 
for the plaintiff.  Lapp, 721 F.2d at 462. 
 The district court made factual findings in every 
relevant area of inquiry, but it did not formally apply the Scott 
Paper factors.  Lapp, 721 F.2d at 463.  We applied them and found 
they weighed in favor of the plaintiff.   While the parties' 
sales efforts at that time were not directed to the same targets, 
there was evidence that they would likely clash in the future; 
defendant, which had previously sold wire and cable for use in 
electrical components shipped to Europe and conforming to 
European specifications, had begun to manufacture wire and cable 
15 
that met United Stated specifications.  We noted "[t]his 
development considerably increase[d] the overlap in the parties' 
actual and potential customer pool," id. at 464, and determined 
plaintiff's ceramic insulators and defendant's wire and cable 
were closely related functionally.  Both were basic electrical 
components and were often used together.   
 We concluded customers would find it natural for the 
manufacturer of Lapp ceramic insulators and pole hardware to 
expand into wire and cable, and Lapp-Interpace introduced 
evidence it planned to do just that.  We noted:  
The likelihood-of-expansion factor is pivotal 
in non-competing products cases such as this. 
One of the chief reasons for granting a 
trademark owner protection in a market not 
his own is to protect his right someday to 
enter that market.  When it appears extremely 
likely, as it does here, that the trademark 
owner will soon enter the defendant's field, 
this final factor weighs heavily in favor of 
injunctive relief.   
Id. (citation omitted).  We noted the purpose of the ten-factor 
analysis was to determine likelihood of confusion in those cases 
where the trademark owner had not yet entered the defendant's 
market.  The factors are of importance here, where the markets 
for peat moss and fertilizer overlap slightly, but are not in 
direct competition.  The two products are often used together. 
Fisons has not yet entered the consumer fertilizer market, but 
claims it has plans to do so and introduced evidence to that 
effect. 
 
B.  Reverse Confusion 
16 
 Plaintiffs under the Lanham Act also rely on "reverse 
confusion" or "dilution" of trademark theories that have been 
adopted by a number of other courts of appeal.0  Ordinarily, one 
expects that the new or junior user of the mark will use to its 
advantage the reputation and good will of the senior user by 
adopting a similar or identical mark.  Reverse confusion occurs 
when a larger, more powerful company uses the trademark of a 
smaller, less powerful senior owner and thereby causes likely 
confusion as to the source of the senior user's goods or 
services.  See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 
F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992) (Quaker Oats Co.'s use of "Thirst-Aid" 
in advertising for Gatorade was trademark infringement of 
"Thirst-Aid" registered trademark owned and formerly used by 
small Vermont company); Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 
Inc., 841 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1988) (marketer of women's clothing 
with unregistered trademark "Bee Wear" could enjoin Bloomingdales 
from using term "B-Wear" in its stores and on its clothes); 
Ameritech, Inc. v. American Information Technologies Corp., 811 
F.2d 960 (6th Cir. 1987) (use by defendant holding company for 
five midwestern Bell telephone companies of unregistered trade 
name and mark of plaintiff, a small Ohio corporation that 
reclaimed industrial oils, might cause consumers to assume 
plaintiff was subsidiary of defendant); Capital Films Corp. v. 
Charles Fries Productions, Inc., 628 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980) 
                                                           
0While we have not previously adopted these theories, in Lapp, we 
spoke of protecting the market for expansion by a senior user of 
a trademark, one of the considerations in reverse confusion. See 
Lapp, 721 F.2d at 464. 
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(reverse confusion doctrine could be applied where defendants, 
including American Broadcasting Company, planned to produce movie 
on Lee Harvey Oswald bearing same title as movie produced by 
small production company); Big O Tire Dealers, Inc., v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977) (reverse 
confusion occurs where "infringer's use of plaintiff's mark 
results in confusion as to origin of plaintiff's product").  In 
reverse confusion, 
the junior user saturates the market with a 
similar trademark and overwhelms the senior 
user.  The public comes to assume the senior 
user's products are really the junior user's 
or that the former has become somehow 
connected to the latter.  The result is that 
the senior user loses the value of the 
trademark -- its product identity, corporate 
identity, control over its goodwill and 
reputation, and ability to move into new 
markets. 
Ameritech, 811 F.2d at 964.   
 Without the recognition of reverse confusion, smaller 
senior users would have little protection against larger, more 
powerful companies who want to use identical or confusingly 
similar trademarks. 
 The logical consequence of [failing to 
recognize reverse confusion] would be the 
immunization from unfair competition 
liability of a company with a well 
established trade name and with the economic 
power to advertise extensively for a product 
name taken from a competitor.  If the law is 
to limit recovery to passing off, anyone with 
adequate size and resources can adopt any 
trademark and develop a new meaning for that 
trademark as identification of the second 
user's products.   
18 
Big O Tire Dealers, 561 F.2d at 1372 (quoting Big O Tire Dealers 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219, 1236 (D. Colo. 
1976)).   
 Although we have not yet adopted the doctrine of 
reverse confusion in a trademark case, we do so here and endorse 
the statement of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit: 
The objectives of [the Lanham] Act -- to 
protect an owner's interest in its trademark 
by keeping the public free from confusion as 
to the source of goods and ensuring fair 
competition -- are as important in a case of 
reverse confusion as in typical trademark 
infringement.  Were reverse confusion not a 
sufficient basis to obtain Lanham Act 
protection, a larger company could with 
impunity infringe the senior mark of a 
smaller one.  Consequently, we hold that 
reverse confusion . . . is actionable under 
§43(a) of the Lanham Act. 
Banff, 841 F.2d at 490-91 (citation omitted). 
 
III. 
 On appeal, Fisons contends the district court 
misapplied the relevant law in finding there was little 
likelihood of confusion.0  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
                                                           
0We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error,  
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assn., Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 
949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991), and exercise plenary review 
over its interpretation, application and conclusions of law.  
Tudor Dev. Group v. United States Fidelity & Gaur. Co., 968 F.2d 
357, 359 (3d Cir. 1992).   We review the cross-appeal of a denial 
of attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act for abuse of discretion.  
Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778, 782 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
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 In this case, the mark is registered and incontestible, 
so plaintiff had to show only likelihood of confusion to be 
entitled to relief.  Because the goods in question are not in 
direct competition, the district court applied the ten-factor 
test of Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 
1983).  The district court found "purchasers of ordinary 
intelligence" were unlikely to confuse the Fisons' Fairway 
trademark with Vigoro's Fairway Green mark.  On appeal, Fisons 
contends the court misapplied the Lapp factors and should have 
applied the law of reverse confusion.   
 In its analysis of the likelihood of confusion, the 
district court combined some of the ten factors set out in Ford 
Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3d 
Cir. 1991) and Lapp and omitted others.  We follow its outline 
and note the corresponding Lapp factors in parentheses. 
 
A.  Channels of Trade and Evidence of Actual Confusion (Lapp 
factors (6), (4), (7), (8) and (3)). 
 The district court stated: 
 These two products, fertilizer and peat 
moss, are sold in similar channels of trade, 
including retail home and garden supply 
stores, and they are directed to the same or 
similar purchasers, homeowners who do their 
own lawn and garden care.  With Vigoro 
placing its product in the market in August 
of 1992, and having implemented an extensive 
plan for promotion and advertising in that 
market, one would have expected that, if 
there were a substantial risk of actual 
confusion in the market place, the plaintiff 
would have come forward at the trial in July 
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of 1991 with some evidence of that actual 
confusion.  It did not. 
 
Fisons Horticulture, slip op. at 8.  Although acknowledging the 
channels of trade (Lapp factor (7)) and the target audience (Lapp 
factor (8)) were the same or similar, the district court did not 
weigh these similarities in Fisons' favor.  Instead, it appeared 
to assume that because of these similarities, plaintiff should 
have been able to collect and present evidence of actual 
confusion (Lapp factor 6)) if there had been any risk or 
likelihood of confusion.  Because plaintiff did not present such 
evidence, the court apparently failed to count the similarities 
in channels of trade and target audience in Fisons' favor.  The 
district court misapplied the law here.  In Lapp, we did not 
discount the strength of plaintiff's case in one area because of 
weakness in another; we weighed each factor separately.0  More 
importantly, while evidence of actual confusion would strengthen 
plaintiff's case, it is not essential.  As we stated in Lapp, 
"Once a trademark owner demonstrates likelihood of confusion, it 
is entitled to injunctive relief."  Lapp, 721 F.2d at 462.   
 Furthermore, the district court's conclusion that any 
evidence of actual confusion (Lapp factor (6)) would have 
appeared in the time the two products were on the market (Lapp 
                                                           
0This is not to say that all factors must be given equal weight.  
The weight given to each factor in the overall picture, as well 
as its weighing for plaintiff or defendant, must be done on an 
individual fact-specific basis.  Not all of the factors are 
present in every case.  We have emphasized the importance of 
similarity of the marks in likelihood of confusion, Ford Motor 
Co., 930 F.2d at 293, but we have not ranked the factors 
otherwise. 
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factor (4)) may not be warranted in this case.  The district 
court stated that Vigoro had placed its product in the market in 
August, 1991, a year before the start of the trial, but that 
finding was in error.  August, 1991 was the date of the trade 
show when Vigoro first displayed its new product, not the date of 
distribution to retail outlets or even to distributors.  The 
fertilizer was not shipped to distributors until January 1992 and 
probably was not offered to consumers until a month or more after 
that.  The test is the likelihood of confusion from the 
perspective of ordinary consumers, not from the perspective of 
people in the trade.  See Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 297.  By 
the start of trial, the product had been available to consumers 
for less than six months.   
 When parties have used similar marks for a sufficient 
period of time without evidence of consumer confusion about the 
source of the products, there is an inference that future 
consumers will not be confused either.  See e.g. Scott Paper, 589 
F.2d at 1230 (finding no likelihood of confusion in part because 
"defendant's mark had been utilized . . . for over forty years 
without any evidence of actual confusion.").  In this case, the 
district court will have to reevaluate Lapp factor (4) in light 
of the fact that Vigoro's produce was not available to consumers 
until the winter or spring of 1992.  In addition, the court 
should take into account that the products were ones consumers 
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spend little time and care in selecting; in the case of such 
products, confusion as to their origin may pass unnoticed.0 
 
B.  Similarity of the Two Marks (Lapp factor (1)). 
 As we have said, degree of similarity of the marks may 
be the most important of the ten factors in Lapp.  Ford Motor 
Co., 930 F.2d at 293.  In considering this factor, the district 
court noted the obvious similarities in Fisons' and Vigoro's 
marks.  "Both include the word fairway.  Both attempt to 
associate the product with golf, and both do so by using a 
package design that has a golf course green, a pin on the green 
and a red triangular flag on the pin [as opposed to the 
rectangular flag generally found on golf courses]."  Fisons 
Horticulture, slip op. at 8.  The court, however, declined to 
find these similarities confusing.  It stated: 
                                                           
0Because the products at issue represent a small investment for 
the consumer, this may not be a case in which actual confusion 
would readily manifest itself to a manufacturer.  The products 
are not likely to malfunction.  If the consumer thinks Fairway 
peat moss and Fairway Green fertilizer are produced by the same 
company, the manufacturers may not know. "Purchasers are unlikely 
to bother to inform the trademark owner when they are confused 
about an inexpensive product."  Beer Nuts v. Clover Club Foods 
Co., 805 F.2d 920, 928 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Union Carbide 
Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).   
 
 The court did not discuss Lapp factor (3), the price of 
the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention 
expected of ordinary consumers when making a purchase.  The 
greater the care and attention, the less the likelihood of 
confusion.  Although the district court made no finding on this 
factor, there was uncontested evidence in the record that 
consumers spend little time and attention deciding which of the 
low-cost products to buy in this market.   
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[W]hile the two marks incorporate the word 
[fairway]0, they do so in ways that suggest 
somewhat different things.  Fairway suggests 
a thing or a place, a golf course fairway. 
Fairway Green suggests a color, the color of 
a golf course fairway (although including a 
drawing of a golf course green on the package 
may lead one to associate Fairway Green with 
the green on a golf course).  The names alone 
do not, therefore suggest a risk of 
confusion. 
Id. at 8-9 (footnote added).  The court went on to note that 
while there were some similarities in the packaging, the 
differences in design, color, and materials were so substantial 
they tended to differentiate the products and sellers.0  Id. at 
9. 
 The fact that there may be some differences in what the 
two names suggest is not alone enough to conclude the names are 
not confusingly similar.  Vigoro's use of Fisons' entire 
trademark, "Fairway," in an arc over a descriptive word, "green," 
suggests a likelihood of confusing similarity.  "[A] subsequent 
user may not avoid likely confusion by appropriating another's 
entire mark and adding descriptive or non-descriptive matter to 
it."  J. Thomas McCarthy, 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition, § 23:15[8] at 23-102 (3d ed. 1992).  Vigoro contends 
that courts have not recognized such a rule explicitly, but this 
court and others have recognized it implicitly.  In Lapp, we 
                                                           
0The district court's opinion used the word "green" here, but it 
must have meant "fairway," because both marks contain only one 
common word, "fairway." 
0Fisons pointed out the similarities in the pictures of golf 
course greens on the packages, but made no claim for trade dress 
infringement.  However, similarity in trade dress is "highly 
probative" of likelihood of confusion.  Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d 
at 297. 
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found the trademarks "Lapp" and "Lapp Cable" identical for all 
practical purposes.  721 F.2d at 463.  See also Tree Tavern 
Products, Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 640 F.Supp. 1263, 1270 (D. Del. 
1986) ("[S]imilarity between the marks 'Side Dish' and 'Banquet 
Side Dish for One' is obvious"); Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 
930 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1991) (where dominant portions of two 
marks, "Country Floors" and "Country Tiles," are the same, 
confusion is likely).  Here, the similarity of marks resembles 
that in Lapp.  As Fisons correctly noted, trademark infringement 
does not require exact copying of the trademark as the owner uses 
it.  "The marks need not be identical, only confusingly similar." 
Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Products Co., 963 F.2d 
628, 636 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Country Floors, 930 F.2d at 
1063).  They are confusingly similar if ordinary consumers would 
likely conclude that Fairway peat moss and Fairway Green 
fertilizer share a common source, affiliation, connection or 
sponsorship.  Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 
F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir. 1992); see also International Kennel 
Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1089 (7th Cir. 
1988); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 (4th Cir. 
1986). 
 In analyzing the appearance of the products, as in 
analyzing their names, the district court did not seem to focus 
on the overall impression.  As the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit stated, the test for determining the 
similarity of the marks is "whether the labels create the 'same 
overall impression' when viewed separately."  Banff, Ltd. v. 
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Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(citations omitted).  See American Auto. Ass'n. v. AAA Ins. 
Agency, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 787, 792 (W.D.Tex. 1985) (In 
determining whether two marks are confusingly similar, 
appropriate test is not side-by-side comparison of marks, the 
emphasizing differences in detail, but whether average consumer, 
on encountering one mark in isolated circumstances of marketplace 
and having only general recollection of the other, would likely 
confuse or associate the two.)  In Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 
293, we stated: 
 Perhaps the most important of these [10] 
factors is the first on the Scott Paper list: 
the degree of similarity between the two 
marks.  We recently held that "if the overall 
impression created by marks is essentially 
the same, 'it is very probable that the marks 
are confusingly similar.'"   
Id. at 293.    
 We conclude the district court misapprehended the legal 
standard when it undertook a detailed analysis of the differences 
in the marks rather than focusing on the overall impression 
created by them. 
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C.  Strength of the Fairway Mark (Lapp factor (2)). 
 The district court credited Fisons' evidence of 
strength of its mark: that the mark was incontestible within the 
meaning of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1065,0 that it was 
a strongly suggestive mark bordering on being arbitrary, and that 
it had been in use for thirty years.  However, the court 
concluded: 
 This list of examples of the strength of 
the Fisons mark is not particularly 
compelling evidence of risk of confusion. 
Fisons has not, for example, shown that its 
FAIRWAY mark is uncommon, or contains an 
unusual use of the word; nor has it shown 
that it has built up the strength of the mark 
over the years with a substantial economic 
investment that can be confirmed by evidence 
of a depth of consumer awareness of the mark 
and its product.  Fisons' failure to offer 
this evidence undermines its argument that 
FAIRWAY is, in fact, a strong mark. 
Fisons Horticulture, slip op. at 10.  Fisons contends the 
district court applied incorrect standards in ignoring its 
evidence of strength and using other tests for the strength of 
its mark.  Fisons argues its mark qualifies for protection 
because of its distinctiveness.  Trademark law recognizes 
categories of marks based on their levels of inherent 
distinctiveness.  From least to most distinctive, they are: (1) 
generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; and (5) 
fanciful.0  Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 
                                                           
0For the meaning of "incontestible" under the Lanham Act, see, 
supra, n. 7.  
0Sometimes, only four categories are used, with arbitrary and 
fanciful grouped together.  See e.g. Dranoff-Perlstein Assoc. v. 
Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 855 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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2757 (1992). The latter three categories are deemed "inherently 
distinctive" and are entitled to protection.  Id. The word 
"green" is so common that it has no trademark significance when 
applied to lawn and garden products, but there was expert 
testimony, which the district court accepted, that the term 
"Fairway" was either suggestive or arbitrary.0  It could 
therefore qualify for protection. 
 The district court focused on Fisons' failure to show 
that its mark, "Fairway," was uncommon or contained an unusual 
use of the word.  The fact that a word is common does not 
necessarily make it weak or unworthy of protection as a 
trademark; the district court's focus on an unusual use of the 
word is closer to mark.  As the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit stated, "The significant factor is not 
whether the word itself is common, but whether the way the word 
is used in a particular context is unique enough to warrant 
trademark protection."  Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 
1190 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988).  The words "shell," "camel" and "apple" 
are not uncommon, but they are arbitrary when applied to 
gasoline, cigarettes and computers.  1 McCarthy on Trademarks, 
                                                           
0Arbitrary trademarks are ones that do not describe any quality 
or characteristic of the goods or services for which they are 
used.  The mark "V-8" on juice made from eight different 
vegetables was held to be arbitrary.  Standard Brands, Inc. v. 
Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945).  As a result of advertising, 
consumers came to associate the mark with such a drink, but 
without advertising, no one could have reasonably expected 
consumers to associate V-8 with a vegetable juice cocktail. Id.; 
see also 1 McCarthy on Trademarks § 11.04[1]. 
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§11:26[3].0  Similarly, the term "Fairway," is not uncommon, but 
when applied to peat moss, Fisons' expert stated it ranked 
between arbitrary and suggestive on the scale of distinctiveness. 
Fisons therefore presented evidence that its use of the common 
term was unusual enough that it could qualify for trademark 
protection.  
 Distinctiveness on the scale of trademarks is one 
measure of a mark's strength.  See, e.g., Nutri/System Inc. v. 
Con-Stan Industries, Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 1987). 
Commercial strength, or marketplace recognition of the mark, is 
another.  See e.g. Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 297.  Vigoro 
contends the registration and use of "Fairway" as a trademark by 
third parties for related products and services undermines 
Fisons' claim of the strength of its mark.  O.M. Scott registered 
a trademark, "Super Fairway," for commercial fertilizer in 1989, 
and six other companies have active or pending registrations of 
marks using the term "Fairway" for grass seed, lawn and garden 
machinery and equipment, and lawn services.  While other 
registrations and uses of Fairway for related products and 
services would make the mark less strong if they were in the same 
market, their use in different markets and for products and 
services that are not closely related does not necessarily 
undermine Fisons' claim of strength.     
                                                           
0McCarthy refers to the conclusion that a common word is 
automatically "weak" as a trademark as the 'Common Word' fallacy. 
1 McCarthy on Trademarks § 11.26[3]. 
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 The district court found Fisons had not demonstrated it 
had built up consumer awareness of the mark and its product 
through substantial investment and concluded Fisons' failure to 
offer evidence of commercial strength "undermines its argument 
that FAIRWAY is, in fact, a strong mark."  Fisons Horticulture, 
slip op. at 10.  If this were a case of forward confusion, rather 
than reverse confusion, the district court would be correct in 
giving considerable weight to evidence of commercial strength, or 
its absence. 
 But in a case of reverse confusion, the evidence of 
commercial strength is different from what we expect in a case of 
forward confusion, where the junior user tries to palm off his 
goods as those of the senior user.  In forward confusion, the 
junior user trades on the senior user's good name; it is 
therefore saved much of the expense of advertising to create 
market recognition of its mark.  In reverse confusion, the junior 
user is typically a wealthier, more powerful company who can 
overwhelm the market with advertising.  An aggressive junior user 
may thereby achieve greater commercial strength in a short period 
of time than the senior user has after years of marketing its 
product.  See, e.g., Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1367-68 (10th Cir. 1977) (in one year, 
defendant Goodyear spent over $9,690,000 in massive, nationwide 
promotional campaign using "Bigfoot" trademark of plaintiff, a 
small tire-buying organization with total net worth of $200,000). 
"The result is that the senior user loses the value of the 
trademark -- its product identity, corporate identity, control 
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over its goodwill and reputation, and ability to move into new 
markets."  Ameritech, Inc. v. American Information Technologies 
Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987).  In one year, Vigoro 
spent over $500,000 on advertising its new product, Fairway 
Green.  That is approximately the amount of Fisons' total yearly 
sales of Fairway peat moss. 
 Fisons' Fairway mark was strong on the scale of 
trademarks and in active use when Vigoro started using the 
Fairway Green mark, but it was commercially weak.  The district 
court, in treating this case like one of forward confusion, put 
great emphasis on the lack of commercial strength of Fisons' mark 
and virtually none on its distinctiveness.  In reverse confusion, 
the mark of the senior user is typically weaker commercially than 
that of the junior user.  On remand, the strength of Fisons' mark 
will have to be reevaluated in light of our adoption of reverse 
confusion and its distinctiveness as well as its commercial 
strength will have to be considered. 
 
D.  Vigoro's Intent in Adopting the Mark (Lapp factor (5)). 
 The district court had the following to say about 
Vigoro's intent: 
The relevant intent inquiry in a likelihood 
of confusion case is "whether the defendant 
adopted a mark with the intent of promoting 
confusion and appropriating the prior user's 
good will."  W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. 
v. The Gillette Co., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609, 1619 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 
1051 (2d Cir. 1993).  There is no proof that 
Vigoro adopted the name Fairway green in an 
attempt to benefit from the general good will 
developed by Fisons in its FAIRWAY mark. 
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Fisons Horticulture, slip op. at 10.   
 While the inquiry the district court identifies as the 
"relevant intent inquiry" is important, it is appropriate to 
cases of forward confusion, not reverse confusion.  In the latter 
type of case, the junior user does not seek to trade on the good 
will and name of the senior user; instead he overwhelms it.   
 The intent inquiry appropriate to this case is more 
like one we identified in Lapp in relying on the district court's 
finding that Lapp, "while it may have acted innocently, was 
careless in not conducting a thorough name search for American 
uses of the name."  Lapp, 721 F.2d at 463.  The questions the 
district court should consider here are whether Vigoro conducted 
an adequate name search for other companies marketing similar 
goods under trademarks including the name "Fairway," and whether 
it followed through with its investigation when it found there 
were such companies.  Did Vigoro consider the likelihood of 
confusion with other companies' marks and products (as opposed to 
considering the likelihood that someone would contest its new 
mark)?  Did it attempt to contact companies using a similar mark, 
such as Fisons?  Was Vigoro careless in its evaluation of the 
likelihood of confusion? 
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E.  Fisons' Plans to Enter the Market (Lapp factor (10)). 
 The district court found: 
 Fisons currently sells fertilizer in 
Canada.  At the trial it offered some 
evidence that it had plans to expand that 
business into the United States.  There was 
not sufficient evidence on this point to 
suggest that this possibility should be a 
factor in an analysis of a risk of possible 
likelihood of confusion.   
Fisons Horticulture, slip op. at 10.  As this factor appears in 
Lapp, it includes "other facts suggesting that the consuming 
public might expect the prior owner to manufacture a product in 
the defendant's market, or that it is likely to expand into that 
market."  721 F.2d at 463-64.  The district court considered only 
evidence of planned expansion, the second part of the test.  Such 
a narrow view is not warranted. 
 Under Lapp, the court looks not only at the likelihood 
of expansion, but also at facts "suggesting the consuming public 
might expect the prior owner to manufacture a product in the 
defendant's market."  721 F.2d at 463.  In a case of reverse 
confusion, it may also consider facts suggesting the consuming 
public might expect the junior owner to manufacture a product in 
the senior user's market.  One fact suggesting this possibility 
is that other companies market both products.  Fisons presented 
evidence that the market leader, O.M. Scott, sold both peat moss 
and fertilizer under the same brand name, Hyponex.  In addition, 
three other lawn and garden companies in this country, Kellog, 
Gandini and Fertiloam sell both peat moss and fertilizer under 
the same brand name.  Therefore, the public is used to seeing 
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both fertilizer and peat moss marketed under the same name by the 
same company. 
 Second, the products are closely related and are used 
together in preparing lawns and gardens.  Even if other companies 
did not market both products, the consuming public might find it 
natural for one company to do so.  See, e.g., International     
Kennel Club, 846 F.2d at 1089 (fact that parties' products are 
the kind the public might very well attribute to the same source 
provides additional evidence of likelihood of confusion). 
 Finally, there is Fisons' evidence of planned 
expansion.  In Lapp, we stated: 
One of the chief reasons for granting a 
trademark owner protection in a market not 
his own is to protect his right someday to 
enter that market.  2 J.T. McCarthy, 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:5 
(1973).  When it appears extremely likely, as 
it does here, that the trademark owner will 
soon enter the defendant's field, this . . . 
factor weighs heavily in favor of injunctive 
relief. 
Lapp, 721 F.2d at 464.  In Lapp, where the evidence showed 
expansion to be extremely likely, the factor weighed heavily in 
plaintiff's favor.  If there is evidence of expansion, but it is 
less strong, it will weigh less heavily in plaintiff's favor. 
 
F.  Relationship of the Goods (Lapp factor (9)). 
 The district court did not consider this factor, "the 
relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers because of 
the similarity of function."  Fisons' peat moss and Vigoro's 
fertilizer are both sold as soil conditioners and meant to be 
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used for the same purpose: to improve the soil for planting.  The 
question is whether the consumer might therefore reasonably 
conclude that one company would offer both of these related 
products.  In Scott Paper, 589 F.2d at 1230, we noted other cases 
in which the relationship of the products was close enough to 
lead to the likelihood of confusion and the relationship of those 
products: Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 
1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1976) (women's scarves and apparel with 
women's cosmetics and fragrances); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of 
Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th cir. 1976) (liquor with 
restaurant selling liquor); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, 
Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381-82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 
(1976) (batteries and lamps with light bulbs and lamps); Alfred 
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Kasser Distillers Products Corp., 350 
F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 480 F.2d 
917 (3d cir. 1973) (pipe tobacco and bar accessories with scotch 
whisky).  See Scott Paper, 589 F.2d at 1230. 
  In Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th 
Cir. 1988), the court analyzed this factor under the category, 
"Relatedness of the Goods."  It assessed the relatedness of the 
car care products one company sold to consumers and the bulk car 
wax for use in car washes and the car washing service another 
company sold under an essentially similar trademark.  The court 
noted the test was whether the goods were similar enough that a 
consumer could assume they were offered by the same source.  The 
court concluded, "A consumer who was used to buying CLASSIC 
products to wash his or her car could easily assume that the 
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makers of CLASSIC products had expanded into the car wash 
business."  839 F.2d at 1187.   
 In this case, the question is whether a consumer who 
bought Fisons' peat moss could reasonably assume that the company 
had expanded its offerings to include fertilizer or, as would be 
more likely in this case of reverse confusion, whether a consumer 
who bought or saw the advertising for Fairway Green fertilizer 
could reasonably assume that the same source also offered the 
Fairway peat moss it saw in the stores. 
 
G.  Weighing the Factors 
 Of the ten factors set out in Ford Motor Co. and Lapp 
for determining the likelihood of confusion, the district court 
misapplied some and did not consider others.  On remand, it 
should consider each of the factors and weigh each in a manner 
consistent with this opinion and with the other case law. 
 
H.  State Law Claims 
 The district court concluded that Fisons' Lanham Act 
claims failed because there was no likelihood of confusion and, 
therefore, its state law claims failed as well.  Because the 
court will reconsider the likelihood of confusion on remand, it 
should also reconsider Fisons' state law claims. 
IV. 
 For reasons stated above, we will reverse the judgment 
of the district court as to Fisons' claims under the Lanham Act 
and remand for a new trial on those claims and the state law 
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claims.0  We will affirm the judgment of the district court 
denying Vigoro's claim for attorneys' fees as a prevailing party 
under the Lanham Act. 
 
Fisons Horticulture v. Vigoro Industries 
No. 93-7224 and 93-7287 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 The majority opinion has convincingly analyzed this 
appeal under Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 
F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1978) and Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, 721 F.2d 
460 (3d Cir. 1983).  While I am in wholehearted agreement with 
the majority that we must reverse the district court's ruling on 
the merits,0 I can see no purpose in remanding for retrial of 
Fisons' Lanham Act claims when it is so evident that the marks at 
issue here are confusingly similar. 
 Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the 
district court, enter judgment in favor of Fisons on its Lanham 
Act claims, and remand with instructions that the district court 
fashion the appropriate relief, and consider Fisons' state 
claims. 
 
                                                           
0We recognize that an extensive record has already been developed 
in this case.  We will leave it to the sound discretion of the 
district court to determine whether any additional evidence is 
appropriate. 
0
 I also agree with the majority that we must affirm the 
district court's denial of Vigoro's request for attorneys' fees 
inasmuch as Vigoro is no longer the prevailing party under 15 
U.S.C. § 1117. 
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 The majority's able opinion not only details the 
analysis required in Lanham Act cases, but also applies that 
analysis to the record before us on appeal.  Typically, having 
found error in the district court's application of the Lapp 
analysis, we would reverse and remand to the district court with 
instructions to take actions consistent with the foregoing 
opinion. 
 Nevertheless, I see little need to do so in the present 
case.  Judge Scirica's majority opinion already has performed the 
Scott Paper/Lapp analysis and the requisite balancing.  That 
analysis can lead to only one conclusion: that the district court 
erred in ruling for Vigoro on the merits of Fisons' Lanham Act 
claims. 
 Although we have held that a district court's finding 
of similarity does not necessarily compel a conclusion that two 
marks are confusingly similar, Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. 
Roosevelt Building Products Co., Inc., 963 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 
1992); Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d 
Cir. 1991), we also have held that "[p]erhaps the most important 
of [the] factors is the first on the Scott Paper list: the degree 
of similarity between the two marks."  Ford Motor Co. v. Summit 
Motor Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3d Cir. 1991).  In 
Opticians Ass'n of Am. v. Independent Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 
187, 195 (3d Cir. 1990), we held that, "if the overall impression 
created by the marks is essentially the same, 'it is very 
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probable that the marks are confusingly similar.'"  (Citation 
omitted). 
 As the majority recognizes, in analyzing the appearance 
of the products at issue here, the district court failed to focus 
on their overall impression.  Maj. Op. typescript at 25.  One 
need only look at the marks themselves to conclude that they are 
so similar that one can only wonder how an ordinary consumer of 
the goods could be anything but confused by the parties' 
indistinguishable use of the FAIRWAY mark.  The packaging of the 
products, the prominent use of the word "Fairway," and the 
inclusion of a triangular flag rising from a tee centered on a 
golfing green, are, for all intents and purposes, virtually 
identical as to both products.  Under Ford Motor Co. and 
Opticians Association of America, this similarity all but creates 
a presumption of the requisite likelihood of confusion. 
 Consequently, I see no point in ordering the district 
court to revisit this trademark controversy in its entirety, and 
compelling the parties to spend additional time, money, and 
efforts on re-litigating the Scott Paper/Lapp factors, when the 
conclusion to which the district court must come has been 
outlined so effectively in the majority's opinion. 
 
II 
 Accordingly, I would reverse the district court's order 
and remand with the direction that the district court enter 
judgment for Fisons on its Lanham Act claims.  On remand, then, 
the district court would have to do no more than fashion the 
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appropriate relief (i.e., frame an injunction, assess damages, 
impose or not impose attorneys' fees, costs, interest, etc.) and 
resolve Fisons' state law claims, which the district court failed 
to address adequately in its initial decision.  Because the 
majority would dispose of this appeal in a manner which I believe 
is wasteful of judicial resources, I dissent from so much of the 
majority's opinion as would remand to the district court for 
retrial of Fisons' Lanham Act claims. 
